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Abstract: We advocate a dynamic approach to monetary convergence to a
common currency that is based on the analysis of financial system stability.
Accordingly, we test empirically volatility dynamics of the ten-year sovereign
bond yields of the 2004 EU accession countries in relation to the eurozone yields
during the January 2, 2001- January 22, 2009 sample period. Our results show a
varied degree of bond yield co-movements, the most pronounced for the Czech
Republic, Slovenia and Poland, and weaker for Hungary and Slovakia. However,
since the EU accession, we find some divergence of relative bond yields. We
argue that a ‘static’ specification of the Maastricht criterion for long-term bond
yields is not fully conducive for advancing stability of financial systems in the
euro-candidate countries.
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I.

Introduction

The central argument of our study is that monetary convergence to a common
currency should be assessed on the basis of dynamic criteria and measures, not on
static, single-moment thresholds. A successful convergence ought to reflect stability
of the converging country’s financial system, coupled with achieving minimum
financial risks, as reflected by the lowest inflation-, interest rate-, and exchange raterisk premia over the corresponding variables in a common currency area. A similar
dynamic treatment applies also to fiscal and real economy convergence, which we
leave out of this study for separate analyses.
We are led to believe that our approach is particularly applicable for the 2004 and
2007 EU entrants that are expected to adopt the euro in the near future. Upon the
examination for their eligibility to adopt the euro, they are expected to attain the
Maastricht criteria of monetary and fiscal convergence. The official monetary
convergence criteria are specified as static thresholds, not as dynamic processes 2. A
static specification of monetary convergence thresholds entails significant risks: a
candidate country may just be lucky to attain static or specified at their level-terms
criteria of convergence, for instance, by applying excessively tight monetary policy in
the period preceding the eligibility examination, at the expense of significant welfare
costs. In a different vein, the candidate may miss the criteria in spite of pursuing a
prudent mix of monetary and fiscal policies prior to examination, due to a temporary
economic slowdown and deflation in the common currency area. We therefore argue
that a successful convergence ought to be based on dynamic trends reflecting
advances in the financial system stability and the low risk environment in the
candidate countries.
We attempt to examine whether a dynamic convergence of interest rate risk has in
fact taken place in the euro-candidate countries. We deal with interest rate, or more
specifically, with ten-year government bond yield convergence, since the declining
path of inflation differentials vis-à-vis the eurozone and exchange rates has been
widely examined in the literature (Orlowski, 2003 and 2008a; Matoušek/Taci, 2003;
2

The Maastricht benchmarks of monetary convergence include the inflation, the long-term interest

rate, and the exchange rate criteria. Specifically, the candidate’s headline inflation cannot be higher
than 1.5 percentage points above the average of the three lowest inflation member countries. The yield
on the candidate’s long-term sovereign bond should not be higher than two percentage points above the
average yield in the three lowest inflation member countries. The exchange rate should fluctuate within
the ERM2 band for at least two consecutive years, without the domestic currency devaluation.
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Kutan/Yigit, 2005; Kočenda, et.al, 2006; DeGrauwe/Schanbl 2005; Kočenda/Valachy,
2006; Poghosyan/Kočenda, 2007). Convergence of bond yields, which is in our
opinion an important, direct reflection of gains in financial stability, has received an
in-depth analytical treatment only recently (Holtemöller, 2005; Kim, et.al, 2006;
Orlowski/Lommatzsch, 2005; Baltzer, et.al, 2008). Such dynamic convergence
reflected by diminishing risk premia on long-term sovereign bond yields is crucial for
sustainable price stability and systemic soundness of the candidates financial systems.
It also lowers probability of potentially destabilizing nominal shocks upon their actual
adoption of the euro.
For the purpose of examining the interest rate risk or volatility convergence of
bond yields we employ the generalized autoregressive conditional volatility models,
with the in-mean variance and generalized error distribution specification (GARCHM-GED). In hindsight, risk convergence is detected if the in-mean variance
coefficient is negative, and when the sum of ARCH and GARCH terms is less than
one. Our model of bond yield convergence is tested empirically during the January 2,
2001-January 22, 2009 sample period for the 2004 EU accession countries that have
been pursuing relatively flexible monetary policies, i.e. Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia3. We exclude currency board countries (i.e. the
Baltic States) as their policy regime eliminates the exchange rate risk while distorting
inflation and interest rate risks, particularly in the presence of Balassa-Samuelson
effects (DeGrauwe and Schnabl, 2005).
In section II of the paper we review the pertinent literature. We subsequently
proceed to empirical investigation of interest rate risk. The time pattern and data
characteristics of the ten-year sovereign bond yields of the euro-candidates are
analyzed in Section III. Volatility dynamics of their bond yields relative to the
average yield in the eurozone member countries are examined in Section IV. The
concluding Section V summarizes our findings and offers policy suggestions.

II.

3

Interplay between convergence and stability in the literature

We have chosen to exclude the 2007 EU entrants, i.e. Bulgaria and Romania, from our analysis due to

insufficient data for examining the time pattern of their bond yields over a full business cycle period..
They have introduced secondary trading of 10Y government bonds only recently: Bulgaria in January
2003 and Romania in April 2005. In addition, Bulgaria has followed a currency board policy regime.
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Although the history of politically-determined monetary convergence and fiscal
criteria for EMU entry is rather brief, there is already an extensive literature on this
subject. The available studies examine rationality and compliance with the
convergence criteria stemming from appropriate policies of governments and central
banks, particularly in light of the Stability and Growth Pact. One strand of the
literature investigates the links between real and nominal convergence (see e.g.,
Halpern and Wyplosz, 2001; Brada et al., 2002; Mihaljek and Klau, 2004; Angeloni et
al., 2005; De Grauwe and Schnabl 2005; Kočenda et al., 2006), with a specific
consequences for real convergence when the Balassa-Samuelson effects are evident.
We disregard possible nominal-real links and concentrate our investigation on
nominal convergence only, as the main motivation and purpose of our study. In
general terms, the literature offers two approaches to the fulfillment and sustainability
of nominal convergence.
One approach is based on investigation whether the monetary and fiscal
Maastricht criteria show long-run properties in their convergence toward the ‘static’
Maastricht thresholds. The time series of the respective aggregates are tested for ßand σ–convergence or for co-integration. Kočenda et al. (2006) augment the
convergence estimations by examining stochastic convergence in the residual. They
find significant inflation and interest rate convergence, but limited fiscal convergence,
which indicates the lack of fiscal sustainability. Brada and Kutan (2001, 2002) and
Brada et al. (2002) apply a rolling co-integration approach, and find evidence of
convergence for some variables, including M2 and prices, but none for other key
monetary policy variables. Figuet and Nenovsky (2006) in their examination of
Bulgaria and Romania employ an error-correction model that untangles long-term cointegration of nominal, real and financial variables from short-run deviations and
interpret the short-term adjustment to the long-run dynamics as convergence. They
find convergence for price levels, interest rates and their spreads between Bulgaria
and the EU, but not for Romania. They explain this result with an important
institutional difference between the two countries - Bulgaria’s monetary policy is
bound by a currency board, while Romania follows a more flexible monetary policy.
As mentioned above, the currency board normally distorts country-specific inflation
and interest rate risks, which could unfold particularly fiercely after adoption of the
euro. This literature offers important insights into the ongoing process of fulfilling
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the Maastricht criteria. However, we are concerned with several problems that might
question the countries’ readiness to adopt the euro.
First, the convergence approach is taken from and linked to growth theory. But
the Maastricht monetary and fiscal criteria refer to policies, which are difficult to
encapsulate in a common theoretical framework. We are inclined to ask whether and
how politically induced regime shifts may affect convergence, interpreted as the
fulfillment of the pre-determined thresholds. The case of Slovenia might be
illustrative: the country fulfilled all convergence criteria ahead of the euro adoption in
2007, but inflation rates diverged thereafter.

Kenen and Meade (2003) provide

another example. They discuss the narrowing of the exchange rate criterion for new
EU members from a ± 15 % to a ±2.5 % bandwidth, and warn against higher financial
crisis risk for the countries in case the revision would be applied to them.
Second, our reservation against the transfer of real convergence approaches to
monetary phenomena seems particularly important within the context of today's
volatile nominal economy. The ongoing turmoil in global financial markets generates
unbalanced contagion and spillover effects on different countries with diverse
financial systems and macroeconomic fundamentals (Orlowski, 2008b). Central banks
and governments around the globe have recently intervened on several occasions
since mid-August 2007 to mitigate heightened liquidity pressures, in order to: (i) ease
concerns about an emerging credit crunch, (ii) prevent bank failures, and (ii) cushion
the adverse impact of the financial market turmoil on the real economy. It seems
necessary to develop a theoretical and empirical framework for the evaluation of
convergence in risks. Such framework goes certainly beyond the evaluation of the
actual achievement of the Maastricht convergence criteria.
Third, there is yet another theoretical argument that encourages our departure
from a static toward a dynamic risk approach. The co-movement in time of economic
aggregates of integrating countries or regions is driven by two completely different
factors: the integration of commodity and input markets, and the similarity of
structures and institutions. For example, presumed convergence of long-term interest
rates of two countries might be achieved through a combination of strong cross-border
investments spurred by financial integration, with dissimilar structural and
institutional characteristics of financial and budgetary sectors. Alternatively, it could
be achieved through low integration and highly similar structural and institutional
characteristics. In the first case, the risks of financial instability after an exogenous
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shock remain high despite the apparent convergence. The adjustment of structures and
institutions towards a common pattern takes more time compared to the financial
integration in the eurozone, if it happens at all.

Therefore, the probability of

occurrence of a regional financial crisis is embedded in the asymmetric distribution of
shocks among the converging countries. The unbalanced contagion effects in the new
EU Member States (NMS) from the ongoing global financial crisis might serve as a
good example for the conflict between the intensity of strong financial inflows and
outflows and the prevalent differences in financial and fiscal institutions.4
This third argument relates our research to the theory of optimum currency
area. In an attempt to assess the EU in its properties of being an OCA, Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1993) offer a method for the separating shock transmissions from the
long-run adjustment component in the time series of member countries. They test
synchronization of business cycles by calculating bivariate correlation coefficients for
de-trended time series of output. They find low synchronization among EU countries
compared to the United States, prior to the euro introduction. Their study reveals
prevalence of asymmetric shock transmissions and high risks of regional output crises
after adopting the common currency. A recent strand of the literature tests the
hypothesis of a possibly endogenous character of currency areas. It follows a seminal
study by Frankel and Rose (1998), who argue that similarity of structures and
institutions is the product of a common currency and single monetary policy, and not
necessarily it’s pre-requisite. The main arguments raised in this literature are based on
estimation of correlation coefficients on: increasing trade intensities (Frankel and
Rose, 1998), as well as specialization patterns and the degree of financial integration
(Imbs, 2004; Schiavo, 2008). In general terms, the studies seem to find evidence for
increasing business cycle synchronization, or real convergence, and declining risks of
regional output crises in the eurozone.
There are only a few studies that transfer the idea of taking shock responses as
indicator for monetary risks and the stability of the Maastricht criteria. The studies we
know, concentrate on the impact of fiscal institutions on interest rate spreads, which

4

In particular, countries such as Hungary with a weak fiscal discipline and a vulnerable monetary

system dominated by lending activities of international banks are likely to experience extreme
difficulties to compensate for the detrimental effects of sudden capital withdrawals on the financial and
real sectors.
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serve as a proxy of financial risk disproportions across regions. For example,
Hallerberg et al. (2004) and Hallerberg and Wolff (2006) analyze the impact of
qualitatively different fiscal institutions on sovereign risk premia in EU countries, and
find: (i) the impact of the quality of fiscal institutions on the spread, and (ii), the
improving quality of fiscal institutions in the EU members during the course of their
preparation for the euro adoption. We follow another methodological approach that
has been also applied by Poghosyan and Kočenda (2007) in their study on foreign
exchange risks in NMS and by Orlowski (2008a) for interest rate and inflation
differentials between NMS and eurozone. These studies employ a multivariate
GARCH-M model, which regards the conditional covariance terms and excludes
arbitrage possibilities. Poghosyan and Kočenda (2007) find that monetary policy has
an important effect on the behavior of exchange rates in NMS. Orlowski (2008a)
shows that relative interest and inflation rates over the eurozone might provide a
useful basis for advancement of inflation targeting policy regimes in the converging
economies. These studies further detect important differences across the countries due
to underlying systemic differences between them. The appealing idea behind their
methodology is to investigate the in-mean GARCH variances. These variances might
be unstable and even increasing, thus require particular attention. A basic assumption
of convergence is a decreasing in-mean GARCH variance in the time series, i.e. a
diminishing risk. Hence, information about the stability and risks cannot be just
linearly extrapolated from historical data. It is better captured by the dynamics of the
in-mean variance in the conditional mean equation. A further appealing advantage is
that one can use financial variables with long-term time series. Moreover, one can
probably circumvent the problem of finding and calculating institutional variables,
often for few moments in time only. The GARCH estimator grasps the aggregate
effects of all the institutional and structural asymmetries, regardless whether real or
nominal convergence can be actually observed in the long-period time-series. The
sign of the in-mean GARCH variance coefficient reflects increasing or decreasing risk
for nominal convergence. Considering these advantages, we have chosen to apply this
method to the interest-rate convergence criterion.

III.

Time Pattern of Bond Yields
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Sovereign bond markets in Central and East European countries have undergone a
notable progress at the advanced stage of economic transition and during active
preparations for accession to the European Union. Long-term bonds could not be
introduced at the early stage of transition from central planning to a market economy
as modern fiscal policies had to be developed and the inflation drivers (such as the
Balassa-Samuelson effects) had to stabilize in order to make dynamic inflation
forecasts more reliable. With the improved predictability of inflation, the term
structure of the government bond yields became more stable, so did the risk premia on
long-term bonds. For these reasons, long-term government bond trading could be
launched only at a more advanced stage of transition. In the examined 2004 EU
accession countries, secondary market trading of ten-year bonds was initiated in the
beginning of: January 1999 in Hungary, May 1999 in Poland, May 2000 in the Czech
Republic, January 2001 in Slovakia, and March 2002 in Slovenia.
During the early period following their inception, long-term bond markets in
these countries were not fundamentally stable. As shown in Figures 1a and 1b, risk
premia of 10Y bonds yields in the May 2004 EU accession countries over the average
10Y bond yield of the fifteen members (EUR15) that comprised the eurozone at the
end of 2008 were considerably elevated, ranging from 680 basis points (bps) in
Poland, to just under 200 bps in the Czech Republic. It is, therefore, not surprising
that the sovereign bond yield compression of these countries to eurozone bond yields
has not taken place at the early period, as proven by Holtemöller (2005), Kim, et.al
(2006) and Baltzer, et.al (2008). During the course of active preparations for their EU
accession, disciplined fiscal and monetary policies along with the declining inflation
have helped reduce these premia considerably. Since 2004, however, the risk premia
in the examined countries have evolved in different directions. Bond yields in the
countries that moved decisively toward adopting the euro, i.e. in Slovenia and
Slovakia, as well as in the Czech Republic have become recently fully aligned with
the EUR15 yield (Figure 1a)5. The risk premium in Poland has been markedly
reduced to the recent level of around 150 bps, while the premium in Hungary has
remained considerably elevated at around 400 bps (Figure 1b).

….. insert Figures 1a and 1b around here …..

The detected dispersion in risk premia of 10Y sovereign bond yields in NMS
is seemingly attributable to the prevalent differences in their fiscal discipline,
5

Slovenia has adopted the euro since January 2007 and Slovakia since January 2009.
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macroeconomic fundamentals and the risk structure of capital inflows. As shown in
Table 1, the government budget deficit is the largest in Hungary, which underpins the
excessive, staggering interest rate risk premium over the average eurozone bond yield.
In line with the top-heavy budget deficit, Hungary’s public debt and inflation remain
to be the highest among the examined NMS. Moreover, the lack of fiscal discipline is
taking a toll on Hungary’s real economy growth – its real GDP growth rate has
become the weakest within the analyzed group of countries. The analysis in Table 1
that is based on 2007 data excludes Slovenia, which already was a member of EUR15
at that time. It includes Slovakia, which met all the Maastricht convergence criteria by
a safe margin two years prior to its euro adoption in 2009. Poland and the Czech
Republic also met the convergence criteria in 2007, as verified in Table 1, but they
may face difficulties maintaining them in the aftermath of the current global financial
crisis and economic slowdown. They apparently have missed a ‘bona fide’ chance to
adopt the euro at the same time as Slovakia. Moreover, some of the NMS that are still
experiencing positive real GDP growth in 2009 are likely to fail the Maastricht
inflation criterion for the reasons independent of their own economic policies. This
temporary setback is caused by the economic recession and deflationary tendencies in
the EU member countries that are most severely affected by the global economic
crisis, which contribute to a drop in the Maastricht reference rate for inflation6.
….. insert Table 1 around here …..
In hindsight, the euro-candidates with the exception of Hungary fulfilled
Maastricht convergence criteria in 2007; however, their budget deficits and overall
convergence may be jeopardized by the current economic and financial turmoil. In
spite of the present difficulties, the NMS need to foster institutional depth and
resilience of their financial markets – they clearly lag in this area behind the eurozone
financial system as shown in Table 1. Deeper, more resilient financial markets are
likely to cushion possible nominal shocks associated with the euro adoption in the
foreseeable future.

6

Specifically, the Maastricht inflation reference rate reached 1.8 percent in February 2009, based on

the Eurostat data (i.e. the average rate for Ireland, Portugal and Spain plus 1.5 percent). At the same
time, the annualized inflation based on the harmonized index of consumer prices reached 3.6 percent in
Poland and 2.9 percent in Hungary. Even the two new eurozone members, i.e. Slovakia and Slovenia
would have failed the inflation test with the annual rates of 2.4 and 2.1 percent respectively. Only the
Czech Republic met the inflation criterion scoring 1.7 percent.
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IV.

Volatility Dynamics Analysis

A deeper insight into dynamic changes and systemic foundations underpinning
convergence of interest rate risk in the euro-candidate countries is provided by the
time-varying analysis of volatility dynamics of 10Y bond yields. As noted above, we
conduct this analysis for the 2004 EU accession countries that follow relatively
flexible monetary policies.
Prior to reporting the results of volatility dynamics tests, we wish to display
selected descriptive statistics of 10Y Maastricht convergence bond yields of the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia at their levels for the daily
series that begin on January 2, 2001 and end on January 22, 2009. The bond yields of
NMS are compared with the average yields on 10Y sovereign bonds of EUR15.

….. insert Table 2 around here …..

As shown in Table 2, the mean value of the Hungarian bond yield is the
highest among the examined NMS, so is its risk premium over the EUR15 mean. The
lowest risk premium over EUR15 based on the mean is detected for the Czech
Republic. The Czech Republic also reached the lowest bond yield as well as the
spread over EUR15 bonds in December 2008. The yields in the two new eurozone
members, Slovenia and Slovakia, were reasonably close to the EUR15 average. The
yields on Polish and Hungarian bonds were respectively 163 bps and 424 bps above
the EUR15 average. The data distribution of 10Y bond yields is right-skewed
(skewness0) for all countries in our sample indicating prevalence of positive over
negative deviations from the mean. It is also mainly leptokurtic (kurtosis>3) or ‘longtailed’, except for Slovakia and EUR15, which implies a wide dispersion of yields or
elevated risk during turbulent times. At the same time, it suggests that NMS financial
markets tend to be highly unstable during the periods of elevated global market risk.
Evidently, a sufficient institutional resilience of NMS financial systems against
exogeneous shocks has not been fully developed. As it could be reasonably expected,
nominal bond yields at their level terms follow a non-stationary trend in all examined
countries, except Slovenia. Hungarian bond yields display weak correlation with
EUR15 yields due to their fragile macroeconomic fundamentals, while correlation of
the remaining NMS with EUR15 bond yields is strong. Moreover, the linear time
trend of NMS bond yields is declining by more than the EUR15 average yield,
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indicating their ongoing convergence or declining risk premia. Hungary is again an
exception; the linear trend path of its bond yield is rising.
For the purpose of our empirical testing, we develop the following model
examining co-movement between domestic RtC and common currency or eurozone
RtE bond yields. The basic stochastic model of bond yield co-movement is
RtC   0  1 RtE   t

(1)

Considering non-stationarity of the examined bond yields at their levels (shown in
Table 2), we convert the model variables to their first-differenced terms denoted by
rt . In addition, the baseline model is augmented with the binary variable DEU t
assuming the value of 0 for the period preceeding the EU accession and 1 for the postaccession daily series. In the estimated equation we also consider the interaction
variable DEU t * rt E in order to ascertain a change in the co-movement between the
domestic and the eurozone bond yields since the EU accession. The augmented model
is prescibed by

rtC   0  1 rt E   2 DEU t   3 ( DEU t * rt E )   t

(2)

Time-varying volatility dynamics of co-movements between the NMS and the
eurozone bond yields is examined on the basis of the GARCH(p,q)-M two-equation
system. The conditional mean equation is derived from Eq.2 and is supplemented
with the GARCH in-mean conditional variance M component  t21 . The conditional
mean equation is represented by
rtC   0  1 rt E   2 DEU t   3 ( DEU t * rt E )   4 t21   t'

(3)

The inclusion of the GARCH variance in the mean equation allows for ascertaining
the overall convergence (or divergence) of government bond yields; therefore for
determining declining (or increasing) interest rate risk. Convergence of bond yields
(decreasing interest rate risk) is detected when  4 0 , while divergence occurs when
 4  0 . An estimated value of the 1 coefficient is expected to be close to or higher
than one if a given change in the eurozone average bond yield drives significantly the
euro-candidates’ yields in the same direction. A negative estimated value of  2 would
imply a further interest rate decline during the post-EU accession period. However, a
negative value of  3 would suggest interest rate divergence since the EU accession.
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Our data generating process assumptions include also the generalized error
distribution (GED) parameterization to account for a possible leptokurtosis in the
data, which is realistic for bond markets and has been also detected from the
examination of the bond yields at their level-terms shown in the Table 2.
The corresponding conditional variance equation is specified as

 t2  h0  h1 t'21  ...  h p  t'2 p  g1 t21  ...  g q t2q

(4)

The ARCH terms h p  t'2 p represent the impact of ‘news’ or shocks to volatility from
p-periods before, while the GARCH terms g q t2q reflect persistency in volatility
carried from q-periods before. In particular, we are focusing on the sum of ARCH
and GARCH coefficients; if its value is less than unity it implies diminishing
volatility (as a proxy of declining interest rate risk).
The selected, most robust results of the GARCH-M-GED tests based on
Eqs.(3) and (4) for each NMS bond yield are shown in Table 3. The orders of p for
ARCH and q for GARCH terms for each NMS bond yield series have been chosen on
the basis of minimum Schwartz information criterion (SIC) and maximum loglikelihood.
..... insert Table 3 around here .....

The estimated 1 coefficients (sensitivity of relative change in domestic to
eurozone bond yields) in the conditional mean equation imply that the changes in the
NMS bond yields respond to the concurrent changes in the eurozone average yields in
the same direction. The co-movement between the domestic and the eurozone bond
yields (i.e. the estimated value of the EUR15 bond yield coefficient  1 ) is the
strongest in the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, followed by Poland. It is
markedly weaker in the cases of Hungary and Slovakia. This interaction is statistically
significant for all countries. The in-mean variance or log(GARCH) variable in the
conditional mean equation is highly significant only in the case of Poland – the
negative sign of the estimated  4 coefficient indicates diminishing volatility of bond
yields (declining interest rate risk) over the entire sample period. There is no evidence
of major changes to the examined interaction between the domestic and the eurozone
bond yields during the post accession period, as implied by the insignificant estimated
DEU coefficients  2 . However, the negative signs of the estimated coefficient  3 of
the interaction variable DEU t * rt E for all NMS with the exception of Slovakia
indicate some divergence in the time pattern of the domestic and the eurozone bond
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yields during the post-EU accession period7. This diversion may stem from a
weakening political will of the Polish and the Czech governments to join the euro,
particularly during the first two years following the EU accession. More importantly,
it stems also from exacerbated interest rate risk in these emerging European market
economies related to pronounced contagion effects of the 2007-2009 global financial
crisis (IMF 2009).
The estimated results of the conditional variance equation indicate a nonuniform, highly unstable impact of shocks or ‘news’ about volatility from the
preceeding periods, demonstrated by the complex structure of ARCH p-orders. The
impact of such shocks on volatility of bond yields is rather instantaneous in the cases
of Hungary and Slovakia. In contrast, there is a considerably slower decay of new
information about volatility from the previous periods in the cases of the Czech and
the Polish bond yields, as implied by significant high-order ARCH terms.
The conditional volatility series is highly persistent in all examined NMS, as
implied by high first-order GARCH terms, except for Slovenia and Slovakia, where
shocks or innovations to volatility play a much stronger role. Nevertheless, the sum
of ARCH and GARCH coefficients for all countries does not exceed unity, which
means a declining path of volatility, thus evidence of diminishing interest rate risk.
However, the volatility series for all five countries is clearly leptokurtic (all GED
parameters are less than 2), which implies that volatility of NMS bonds tends to be
exacerbated during turbulent market periods. This finding demonstrates that NMS
bond markets remain to be excessively vulnerable at times of elevated market
vicissitudes.
The results of diagnostic indicators, i.e. the relatively high log likelihood and the
low SIC estimates imply that the examined series are fairly robust and stable in each
country’s bond yield series. In sum, it can be concluded that the volatility of longterm bond yields is gradually declining in the examined countries, which underpins
the ongoing, albeit rather slow compression of interest rate spreads over EUR15.
Further insights in terms of time-varying properties of the volatility dynamics of
NMS bond yields can be detected from the graphical time-distribution of the GARCH
conditional standard deviation (GARCH-CSD) series estimated from Eqs.(3) and (4).
Figure 2a displays the GARCH-CSD distribution for the Czech Republic. Volatility of
the Czech bond yields was visibly elevated during the first two years of the sample
period, i.e. in 2001-2002 (observations 1-700). During the period preceding the EU

7

This finding is also confirmed by Baltzer, et al. (2008) who demonstrate that NMS government bond

markets have been increasingly affected by adverse shocks in eurozone markets, particularly since the
2004 EU accession.
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accession, volatility of the Czech bond yields was considerably lower. However,
during the post-accession period that is denoted by the shaded area (observations 8702104) the analyzed volatility was initially subdued. But it has elevated considerably
during the most recent two-year period; notably as a result of contagion effects from
world financial markets. In contrast to the Czech case, the numerical values of
GARCH-CSD for Hungary (Figure 2b) are much higher. Moreover, there is no
visible convergence of interest rates, and the volatility of the examined series during
the 2007-2009 global financial crisis has been way too excessive. There is a
significant decline in volatility of the Polish bond yields during the same sample
period (Figure 2c), with a strong dampening effect since the EU accession. There is
certainly a significant increase in volatility of the Polish bond market during the
recent period of the global financial distress, however, to a lesser degree than in the
case of Hungary. However, the levels of GARCH-CSD for the Polish bond yields
have been recently somewhat higher than for the Czech yields, indicating that Poland
may still have to expedite efforts toward achieving greater financial stability. In spite
of a smaller, less-capitalized bond market in Slovakia, its GARCH-CSD has been
relatively stable over the entire sample period, yet again except during the most recent
global financial market jitters (Figure 2d). The GARCH-CSD series of the Slovenian
bond yields is a particularly interesting case. Volatility of the Slovenian yields (Figure
2e) has been consistently very low since the quick expiration of the significant shock
in December 2002. It jumped somewhat on the eve of the euro adoption in January
2007, in response to qualms related to the unpredictable effects of that move. But in
contrast to the other cases, the conditional volatility of Slovenian bonds has not
increased during the current financial crisis, which proves that the euro adoption has
provided Slovenian bond market with an effective cushion against of global market
risk.
….. insert Figures 3a-e around here …..
In hindsight, there is a progress in stability of bond markets and the evidence of
declining risk premia in the countries that have recently joined the eurozone, i.e.
Slovenia and Slovakia, as well as in Poland and Czech Republic. Similar stability
gains are not seen in Hungary, where decisive policy measures ought to be enacted in
order to improve economic fundamentals and develop resilience of its sovereign bond
markets against potential shocks. The recent global financial crisis poses a serious
threat to stability of NMS markets. Our analysis implies that the Slovenian decision to
adopt the euro prior to this crisis was a critical contributing factor to the fundamental
stability of the country’s sovereign bond market.
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V.

A synthesis

Our study examines the ability of the euro-candidate countries to mitigate interest rate
risk as reflected by decreasing volatility of the ten-year sovereign bond yields in
relation to the corresponding yields in the eurozone. We devise a model analyzing the
co-movements between the domestic and the eurozone government bond yields,
which includes a post-EU accession binary variable and the interaction variable
between the post-accession dummy and eurozone average bond yield as additional
regressors. We test the model for NMS that have joined the EU since 2004 and
applied relatively flexible monetary policies, i.e. the Czech Republic, Poland,
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. We employ GARCH tests with the in-mean
conditional variance and generalized error distribution parameterization (GARCH-MGED) to investigate the time-varying, dynamic changes in the volatility of the eurocandidates bond yields.
We find evidence of a pronounced co-movement between the NMS and the
eurozone long-term bond yields. The effect is the strongest in the countries with solid
macroeconomic fundamentals and stable financial markets (the Czech Republic and
Slovakia), while it is the weakest in the unstable environment of Hungary. The low
risk premia for the countries that have recently adopted the euro, i.e. Slovenia and
Slovakia, as well as for the Czech Republic and Poland indicate improvement in their
financial stability and creditworthiness. The co-movement of long-term government
bond yields is the weakest in the case of Hungary and shows some divergence during
the post-EU accession period. The Hungarian bond yields show increasing volatility
and misalignment with the eurozone yields due to the country’s deteriorating
fundamentals. Hungary almost attained the Maastricht-specified reference rate for
long-term interest rates at the end of 2007, but our volatility analysis shows that the
Hungarian and the eurozone bond yields are increasingly out of sync. Our assessment
is confirmed by the recent derailment of the Hungarian risk premium and divergence
of bond yields since 2007. The wider spread of the Hungarian over the eurozone bond
yields has been apparently exacerbated by the combination of the deteriorating
Hungarian economic fundamentals and the contagion from the global financial crisis.
In hindsight, our study advocates a dynamic treatment of monetary
convergence to a common currency. We argue that a ‘static’, level-specification of
convergence targets, such as the articulation of the Maastricht criteria, does not reflect
adequately the dynamic processes that are indispensable for ensuring long-term
stability of the financial system in the converging country. In general terms, such
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processes include institutional advancement and capacity building of financial
markets and intermediaries. Therefore, we focus on dynamic, time-varying changes
in interest rate risk premia proxied by convergence of government bond yields.
Institutional strengthening of financial markets and intermediaries, coupled
with disciplined fiscal policies and monetary regimes based on inflation targeting
have contributed to the declining interest rate risk premia in the examined countries.
However, following the 2004 EU accession and particularly in the most recent twoyear period, the sovereign bond yields display rising volatility, stemming mainly from
the proliferation of the global financial risk. Contagion effects of the global financial
crisis affect the euro-candidates unevenly; being more pronounced in the countries
with unstable fundamentals. Under such circumstances, the Czech Republic and
Poland are likely to find it increasingly difficult to maintain their successful path of
interest rate convergence, which may inhibit their efforts to adopt the euro in the
foreseeable future.
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Table 1: Underlying Fundamentals and Euro-Convergence Indicators (2007 data)
Real

General

Public

HICP

10Y Gov.t

Corporate

Stock

GDP

Gov.t

debt

inflation

Bond

fixed

capitalization

growth

budget

(%GDP)

rate

Yield

securities

rate

(%GDP)

income

market

(%GDP)

(%GDP)

Czech R.

6.6

-1.6*

28.7*

3.0*

4.3*

19.5

35.9

Hungary

1.3

-5.5

66.0

7.9

6.7

14.1

31.5

Poland

6.5

-2.0*

45.2*

2.6*

5.5*

5.0

43.8

Slovakia

10.4

-2.2*

29.4*

1.9*

4.5*

9.2

18.6

Eurozone

-

-3.0

60

3.2

6.5

81.4

73.8

(ref.rate)

(ref.rate)

(ref.rate)

(ref.rate)

(EUR 15)

* denotes fulfilment of Maastricht criteria
Data Source: ECB Convergence Report – April 2008.

Table 2: Ten-Year Maastricht Convergence Bond Yields – Selected Descriptive
Statistics.
January 2, 2001 – January 22, 2009 daily average series.
Czech R.

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

Slovenia**

EUR15

Mean

4.55

7.35

6.58

5.26

5.11

4.26

Max/Min

7.03/3.18

10.78/5.35

12.30/4.41

8.29/3.09

9.62/3.55

5.38/3.07

Dec 2008

4.30

8.31

5.70

4.72

4.56

4.07

0.87

0.81

1.80

1.43

1.58

0.54

Skewness

+0.95

+0.54

+1.55

+0.90

+1.52

+0.09

Kurtosis

3.50

3.34

4.59

2.66

4.34

2.43

Unit root

-2.70

-2.48

-2.04

-2.18

-3.09

-1.72

+0.84

+0.35

+0.76

+0.87

+0.69

1.00

-0.0008

+0.0001

-0.0020

-0.0017

-0.0021

-0.0004

avg level
Standard
Deviation

ADF stat.*
Correlation
with EU12
Linear time
trend

Notes: * McKinnon critical values for ADF unit root test at 5% probability are -2.86
in all cases; ** March 18, 2001 – January 22, 2009 series for Slovenia.
Source: Own calculations based on Datastream and ECB data.

Table 3: GARCH-M-GED estimation results for 2004 EU accession countries.
Dependent variable: daily average changes in domestic 10Y Maastricht Convergence
Government Bond Yields
Czech R.

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

Slovenia

Cond. mean equation:

Constant term

-0.001

0.001

-0.012***

0.018

-0.005

0.727***

0.197***

0.304***

0.047***

0.892***

Log(GARCH)

0.001

-0.001

-0.002***

-0.003

0.001

DEU

0.004

-0.002

-0.001

0.002

-0.001

-0.227***

-0.196***

-0.078***

0.101***

-0.875***

Constant term

0.001**

0.001

0.001***

0.001**

0.004

ARCH(1)

0.061*

0.478***

0.048*

0.184***

0.142***

ARCH(2)

-0.018

-0.051

0.021

-0.022

0.030

ARCH(3)

0.057

-0.120

0.037

0.039***

0.006

ARCH(4)

-0.065

0.024

0.030

0.033*

-0.018

ARCH(5)

0.267***

0.259

0.193***

-0.011

-

ARCH(6)

-0.248***

-0.280*

-0.289***

0.023

-

ARCH(7)

-

-

0.089***

0.001

-

ARCH(8)

-

-

-0.083***

0.014*

-

ARCH(9)

-

-

0.053***

-

-

GARCH(1)

0.944***

0.838***

0.895***

0.137

0.398

GED parameter

0.770***

0.410***

0.834***

1.018***

1.5 fixed

-4.190

-2.749

-3.236

-4.246

-2.648

4423.4

2920.1

3440.1

4480.7

2387.2

EUR Bond Yield

DEU*EUR yield

Cond. variance equation:

Diagnostic statistics:
Schwartz Info. Criterion
Log likelihood

Notes: GED parameter is fixed for Slovenia at 1.5; DEU assumes the value of 1 for
the post-EU accession period (since May 4, 2004); the daily series begin January 2,
2001 (March 18, 2001 for Slovenia) and end on January 22, 2009 (2104
observations). *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Datastream data.
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Figure 1: Spreads between the May 2004 EU Accession Countries’ and EUR15 TenYear Bond Yields.
Notes: January 2, 2001 – January 22, 2009 daily average data series (2104
observations). The vertical axis numbers represent full percent or ’00 basis points
(bps). The shaded area shows the post-EU accession (May 2004) period.
Data source: Datastream

Figure 1a: Spreads between sovereign and EUR15 average bond yields for the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
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Figure 1b: Spreads between sovereign and EUR15 average bond yields for Poland and
Hungary.
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Figure 2: GARCH conditional standard deviation residuals generated from
estimations in Table 3.
The shaded areas show the post-EU accession (May 1, 2004) period. Daily series
January 2, 2001 – January 22, 2009 (2104 observations)
Figure 2a: The Czech Republic
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Figure 2d: Slovakia
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